’Til Dowry Do Us Part: Bargaining and Violence in Indian Families
Review of Economics and Statistics · 08.01.2026 · 108 (1) · 129-144
DOI: 10.1162/rest_a_01399 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Review of Economics and Statistics, online erschienen am 08.01.2026. Verfasst von Rossella Calvi und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 19-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 47 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We develop a noncooperative bargaining model with incomplete information linking dowry payments, domestic violence, resource allocation between a husband and a wife, and separation. Our model generates several predictions, which we test empirically using amendments to the Indian antidowry law as a natural experiment. We document a decline in women’s bargaining power and separations and a surge in domestic violence following the amendments. These unintended effects are attenuated when social stigma against separation is low and, in some circumstances, when gains from marriage are high. Whenever possible, parents increase investment in their daughters’ human capital to compensate for lower dowries.
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APA
Calvi, R., & Keskar, A. (2026). ’Til Dowry Do Us Part: Bargaining and Violence in Indian Families. Review of Economics and Statistics, 108(1), 129-144. https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_01399
Vancouver
Calvi R, Keskar A. ’Til Dowry Do Us Part: Bargaining and Violence in Indian Families. Review of Economics and Statistics. 2026;108(1):129-144. doi:10.1162/rest_a_01399
BibTeX
@article{Calvi2026,
author = {Calvi, Rossella and Keskar, Ajinkya},
title = {’Til Dowry Do Us Part: Bargaining and Violence in Indian Families},
journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics},
year = {2026},
volume = {108},
number = {1},
pages = {129--144},
doi = {10.1162/rest_a_01399}
}
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