Influence-Seeking in U.S. Corporate Elites’ Campaign Contribution Behavior
Review of Economics and Statistics · 21.05.2025 · 107 (3) · 685-696
DOI: 10.1162/rest_a_01321 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Review of Economics and Statistics, online erschienen am 21.05.2025. Verfasst von Edoardo Teso. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 22-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 36 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
I leverage a new panel on the contributions to members of the U.S. Congress (MCs) from 401,557 corporate leaders of 14,807 U.S. corporations over 1999–2018 to show that U.S. corporate elites use contributions to political campaigns as a tool of political influence. Donations increase by 11% when a politician is assigned to a committee dealing with policy issues relevant to a corporate leader’s company. The effect is driven by donations to MCs with the greatest power in the committees. I estimate that, absent an influence motive, donations from corporate leaders during this period would have been lower by $20 million.
Zitieren
APA
Teso, E. (2025). Influence-Seeking in U.S. Corporate Elites’ Campaign Contribution Behavior. Review of Economics and Statistics, 107(3), 685-696. https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_01321
Vancouver
Teso E. Influence-Seeking in U.S. Corporate Elites’ Campaign Contribution Behavior. Review of Economics and Statistics. 2025;107(3):685-696. doi:10.1162/rest_a_01321
BibTeX
@article{Teso2025,
author = {Teso, Edoardo},
title = {Influence-Seeking in U.S. Corporate Elites’ Campaign Contribution Behavior},
journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics},
year = {2025},
volume = {107},
number = {3},
pages = {685--696},
doi = {10.1162/rest_a_01321}
}
EUVIMED