Immigration Lottery Design: Engineered and Coincidental Consequences of H-1B Reforms
Review of Economics and Statistics · 03.01.2025 · 107 (1) · 1-13
DOI: 10.1162/rest_a_01252 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Review of Economics and Statistics, online erschienen am 03.01.2025. Verfasst von Parag A. Pathak und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 18-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 72 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
The H-1B Visa Reform Act of 2004 dictates an annual allocation of 85,000 visas with 20,000 reserved for advanced-degree applicants. We represent the main requirements of this legislation as formal axioms and characterize visa allocation rules consistent with the axioms. Despite the precise number reserved, we show that the range of implementations satisfying these axioms can change the allocation of advanced-degree visas by as much as 14,000 in an average year. Of all rules satisfying these axioms, the 2019 rule imposed by executive order is most favorable to advanced-degree holders. However, two earlier modifications resulted in larger changes, possibly unintentionally.
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APA
Pathak, P. A., Rees-Jones, A., & Sönmez, T. (2025). Immigration Lottery Design: Engineered and Coincidental Consequences of H-1B Reforms. Review of Economics and Statistics, 107(1), 1-13. https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_01252
Vancouver
Pathak PA, Rees-Jones A, Sönmez T. Immigration Lottery Design: Engineered and Coincidental Consequences of H-1B Reforms. Review of Economics and Statistics. 2025;107(1):1-13. doi:10.1162/rest_a_01252
BibTeX
@article{Pathak2025,
author = {Pathak, Parag A. and Rees-Jones, Alex and Sönmez, Tayfun},
title = {Immigration Lottery Design: Engineered and Coincidental Consequences of H-1B Reforms},
journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics},
year = {2025},
volume = {107},
number = {1},
pages = {1--13},
doi = {10.1162/rest_a_01252}
}
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