Incentivizing Demand for Supply-Constrained Care: Institutional Birth in India
Review of Economics and Statistics · 09.01.2024 · 106 (1) · 102-118
DOI: 10.1162/rest_a_01206 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Review of Economics and Statistics, online erschienen am 09.01.2024. Verfasst von Alison Andrew und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 16-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 31 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
If overcrowding harms health care quality, the impacts of encouraging more people to use services are not obvious. Impacts will depend on whether marginal entrants benefit and whether they benefit enough to offset the congestion externalities imposed on inframarginal users. We develop a general-equilibrium model that formalizes these ideas. We examine them empirically by studying JSY, a program in India that paid women to give birth in medical facilities. We find evidence that JSY increased perinatal mortality in areas with low health-system capacity, was particularly harmful in more-complex births, reduced the quality of facilities' postnatal care, and generated harmful spillovers onto other services.
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APA
Andrew, A., & Vera-Hernández, M. (2024). Incentivizing Demand for Supply-Constrained Care: Institutional Birth in India. Review of Economics and Statistics, 106(1), 102-118. https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_01206
Vancouver
Andrew A, Vera-Hernández M. Incentivizing Demand for Supply-Constrained Care: Institutional Birth in India. Review of Economics and Statistics. 2024;106(1):102-118. doi:10.1162/rest_a_01206
BibTeX
@article{Andrew2024,
author = {Andrew, Alison and Vera-Hernández, Marcos},
title = {Incentivizing Demand for Supply-Constrained Care: Institutional Birth in India},
journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics},
year = {2024},
volume = {106},
number = {1},
pages = {102--118},
doi = {10.1162/rest_a_01206}
}
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