Managing Inequality: Manager-Specific Wage Premiums and Selection in the Managerial Labor Market
Review of Economics and Statistics · 14.07.2025 · 1-46
DOI: 10.1162/rest.a.269 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Review of Economics and Statistics, online erschienen am 14.07.2025. Verfasst von Alex Xi He und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 4-mal zitiert (Crossref).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper uses a manager-firm-worker matched dataset covering the entire Danish population to identify manager effects on worker wages. We show that manager-specific wage premiums are almost as important as firm-specific wage premiums in explaining betweenfirm wage inequality. Managers who pay higher wages are more likely to be replaced through acquisitions. Manager-specific wage premiums are uncorrelated with productivity and seem to stem from managers' traits and fairness views. Our results highlight the role of managers in understanding between-firm wage inequality and suggest that the managerial labor market tends to select low-paying managers and redistribute wealth from workers to shareholders.
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APA
He, A. X., & Maire, D. L. (2025). Managing Inequality: Manager-Specific Wage Premiums and Selection in the Managerial Labor Market. Review of Economics and Statistics, 1-46. https://doi.org/10.1162/rest.a.269
Vancouver
He AX, Maire DL. Managing Inequality: Manager-Specific Wage Premiums and Selection in the Managerial Labor Market. Review of Economics and Statistics. 2025:1-46. doi:10.1162/rest.a.269
BibTeX
@article{He2025,
author = {He, Alex Xi and Maire, Daniel le},
title = {Managing Inequality: Manager-Specific Wage Premiums and Selection in the Managerial Labor Market},
journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics},
year = {2025},
pages = {1--46},
doi = {10.1162/rest.a.269}
}
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