Fundamentally Reforming the DI System: Evidence from Germany
Review of Economics and Statistics · 14.05.2026 · 1-45
DOI: 10.1162/rest.a.1789 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Review of Economics and Statistics, online erschienen am 14.05.2026. Verfasst von Yaming Cao und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
In 2001, Germany abolished public occupational disability insurance (ODI)—the second tier of its public DI system—for cohorts born after 1960. Using administrative data, we first document that, in the long run, overall DI inflows declined by roughly one-third. Second, using representative survey data, we document at best modest ODI insurance take-up responses in the private individual, risk-rated market, which lacks guaranteed issue. Third, an equilibrium model incorporating interactions between the public safety net, the first-tier public DI, and the private market reveals that coverage denials and weak insurance demand, driven by complementary social insurance, can explain the modest private ODI take-up response. Coverage gradients by income and health are thus substantial. Finally, counterfactual simulations highlight the limited scope of incremental reforms.
Zitieren
APA
Cao, Y., Fischer-Weckemann, B., Geyer, J., & Ziebarth, N. (2026). Fundamentally Reforming the DI System: Evidence from Germany. Review of Economics and Statistics, 1-45. https://doi.org/10.1162/rest.a.1789
Vancouver
Cao Y, Fischer-Weckemann B, Geyer J, Ziebarth N. Fundamentally Reforming the DI System: Evidence from Germany. Review of Economics and Statistics. 2026:1-45. doi:10.1162/rest.a.1789
BibTeX
@article{Cao2026,
author = {Cao, Yaming and Fischer-Weckemann, Björn and Geyer, Johannes and Ziebarth, Nicolas},
title = {Fundamentally Reforming the DI System: Evidence from Germany},
journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics},
year = {2026},
pages = {1--45},
doi = {10.1162/rest.a.1789}
}
EUVIMED