The Large Core of College Admission Markets: Theory and Evidence
Review of Economics and Statistics · 27.10.2025 · 1-42
DOI: 10.1162/rest.a.1628 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Review of Economics and Statistics, online erschienen am 27.10.2025. Verfasst von Péter Biró und 4 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We study college admissions markets where students can attend the same college under different financial terms. The deferred acceptance algorithm identifies a stable allocation where funding is allocated based on merit and the set of meritbased stable allocations is small. When students are heterogeneous in the way they trade off program characteristics and contractual terms, the set of stable allocations is large and different stable allocations differ in the number of assigned students. In Hungary, where such heterogeneity is present, a non-merit-based stable allocation would increase the number of assigned applicants by 1.9% relative to any merit-based stable allocation.
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APA
Biró, P., Hassidim, A., Romm, A., Shorrer, R. I., & Sóvágó, S. (2025). The Large Core of College Admission Markets: Theory and Evidence. Review of Economics and Statistics, 1-42. https://doi.org/10.1162/rest.a.1628
Vancouver
Biró P, Hassidim A, Romm A, Shorrer RI, Sóvágó S. The Large Core of College Admission Markets: Theory and Evidence. Review of Economics and Statistics. 2025:1-42. doi:10.1162/rest.a.1628
BibTeX
@article{Bir2025,
author = {Biró, Péter and Hassidim, Avinatan and Romm, Assaf and Shorrer, Ran I. and Sóvágó, Sándor},
title = {The Large Core of College Admission Markets: Theory and Evidence},
journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics},
year = {2025},
pages = {1--42},
doi = {10.1162/rest.a.1628}
}
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