Internal Convergence: A(n Almost) Neglected Epistemic Virtue
Perspectives on Science · 25.10.2026 · 1-32
DOI: 10.1162/posc.a.588 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Perspectives on Science, online erschienen am 25.10.2026. Verfasst von Ariel Jonathan Roffé und 3 weiteren Autor:innen.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, agreement between two independent theories in a particular prediction has been interpreted as strengthening both our confidence in the prediction and plausibility of the theories in question. This inter-theoretical coincidence has been considered an epistemic virtue in scientific practice as well as in philosophical reflections about it. However, there is an epistemic virtue at work in scientific practice that has received less attention from the community of philosophers of science, and which we aim to emphasize in this paper. It is the coincidence of predictions that appeal to the same theory, which we propose to call “internal convergence.” We will characterize internal convergence metatheoretically, and provide some examples showing how such an epistemic virtue is relevant in scientific practice. We will pay particular attention to the case of cladistics, where internal convergence plays a special role, as the theory is difficult to test empirically.
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APA
Roffé, A. J., Ginnobili, S., Díez, J., & Blanco, D. (2026). Internal Convergence: A(n Almost) Neglected Epistemic Virtue. Perspectives on Science, 1-32. https://doi.org/10.1162/posc.a.588
Vancouver
Roffé AJ, Ginnobili S, Díez J, Blanco D. Internal Convergence: A(n Almost) Neglected Epistemic Virtue. Perspectives on Science. 2026:1-32. doi:10.1162/posc.a.588
BibTeX
@article{Roff2026,
author = {Roffé, Ariel Jonathan and Ginnobili, Santiago and Díez, José and Blanco, Daniel},
title = {Internal Convergence: A(n Almost) Neglected Epistemic Virtue},
journal = {Perspectives on Science},
year = {2026},
pages = {1--32},
doi = {10.1162/posc.a.588}
}
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