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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Bidding Strategy and Clearing Model of Virtual Power Plants in Energy and Inertia Markets

Zicheng Liu, Ciwei Gao, Meng Song, Xingyu Yan, Wenqiang Guo, Jinmeng Zhang, Wei Zhang, Zhixing Wu

International Transactions on Electrical Energy Systems · 2026-01 · 2026 (1)

DOI: 10.1155/etep/6877271 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift International Transactions on Electrical Energy Systems, online erschienen am 19.08.2026. Verfasst von Zicheng Liu und 7 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 28 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

The ongoing decline in system inertia during the energy transition poses serious challenges to frequency stability. Virtual power plants (VPPs) offer a feasible pathway to enhance system frequency support by aggregating distributed inertia resources from the demand side. To this end, this paper proposes an integrated framework that combines bidding and clearing mechanisms to incentivize VPPs to exploit their potential inertia resources. First, an inertia assessment model is developed to characterize the dynamic characteristics of heterogeneous devices within the VPP. On this basis, a bidding strategy incorporating prospect theory is designed, which introduces competitors’ bids as a reference to improve the VPP’s clearing probability while optimizing its expected revenue. Furthermore, a market‐clearing model based on the system marginal pricing principle is established, aiming to minimize total social costs and provide effective price incentives for market participants. Case simulation results demonstrate that compared with a VPP using a conventional expected utility criterion, the proposed strategy significantly improves the VPP’s market clearance rate and increases the VPP’s total revenue by 870.31 CNY, representing a 17.5% relative improvement over the conventional expected utility–based bidding strategy. Meanwhile, the marginal pricing mechanism effectively reflects system inertia scarcity signals, helping to incentivize more inertia resources to participate in the market and ensuring operational security of the system.

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APA

Liu, Z., Gao, C., Song, M., Yan, X., Guo, W., Zhang, J., Zhang, W., & Wu, Z. (2026). Bidding Strategy and Clearing Model of Virtual Power Plants in Energy and Inertia Markets. International Transactions on Electrical Energy Systems, 2026(1). https://doi.org/10.1155/etep/6877271

Vancouver

Liu Z, Gao C, Song M, Yan X, Guo W, Zhang J, et al. Bidding Strategy and Clearing Model of Virtual Power Plants in Energy and Inertia Markets. International Transactions on Electrical Energy Systems. 2026;2026(1). doi:10.1155/etep/6877271

BibTeX
@article{Liu2026,
  author = {Liu, Zicheng and Gao, Ciwei and Song, Meng and Yan, Xingyu and Guo, Wenqiang and Zhang, Jinmeng and Zhang, Wei and Wu, Zhixing},
  title = {Bidding Strategy and Clearing Model of Virtual Power Plants in Energy and Inertia Markets},
  journal = {International Transactions on Electrical Energy Systems},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {2026},
  number = {1},
  doi = {10.1155/etep/6877271}
}
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