Routes and Roots: Uncovering the Origins of DNS Root Server Interception
Proceedings of the ACM on Networking · 19.11.2026 · 4 (CoNEXT4) · 1-16
DOI: 10.1145/3856974 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Proceedings of the ACM on Networking, online erschienen am 19.11.2026. Verfasst von Batuhan Kertmen und 4 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 41 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
The Domain Name System (DNS) is one of the most critical components of the Internet. Yet DNS traffic is prone to interception by on-path middleboxes. Building on prior work characterizing DNS response manipulation of DNS root server traffic, this paper investigates the underlying routing and infrastructure factors that enable interception exposure.We present a large-scale, 29-month measurement study of DNS root server interception using over 15 K RIPE Atlas probes. We combine DNS-level interception detection with autonomous system (AS) relationship traceroute analysis to identify not only which networks intercept root-bound traffic, but why interception varies across paths. We use change-point detection to relate these patterns to root server deployment events over time. Our results show that anomalous root-bound routing is concentrated in a small number of networks. Among paths whose penultimate AS has no documented relationship with root servers (candidates for anomalous routing rather than confirmed interception), the top 10 penultimate autonomous systems account for 74.7% of such paths in IPv4 and 76.6% in IPv6. These no-relationship paths exhibit 21–23% lower destination RTTs than documented-relationship paths, consistent with traffic terminating closer to the probe than legitimate root servers. More broadly, we show that interception is largely path-dependent rather than nationally uniform, with probes in the same country exhibiting sharply divergent rates.We find no reliable evidence that deploying new root server instances influences interception rates. Likewise, interception change points show no statistically significant association with deployment events. Where interception does drop near a deployment, it coincides with an upstream routing change, motivating path-aware deployment planning as a direction for future work.
Zitieren
APA
Kertmen, B., Tumer, D., Nosyk, Y., Cetin, O., & Lone, Q. (2026). Routes and Roots: Uncovering the Origins of DNS Root Server Interception. Proceedings of the ACM on Networking, 4(CoNEXT4), 1-16. https://doi.org/10.1145/3856974
Vancouver
Kertmen B, Tumer D, Nosyk Y, Cetin O, Lone Q. Routes and Roots: Uncovering the Origins of DNS Root Server Interception. Proceedings of the ACM on Networking. 2026;4(CoNEXT4):1-16. doi:10.1145/3856974
BibTeX
@article{Kertmen2026,
author = {Kertmen, Batuhan and Tumer, Duygu and Nosyk, Yevheniya and Cetin, Orcun and Lone, Qasim},
title = {Routes and Roots: Uncovering the Origins of DNS Root Server Interception},
journal = {Proceedings of the ACM on Networking},
year = {2026},
volume = {4},
number = {CoNEXT4},
pages = {1--16},
doi = {10.1145/3856974}
}
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