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Understanding and Detecting GitHub Impersonation through Automated Authorship Attribution

Yueke Zhang, Yifan Zhang, Pamela Wisniewski, Fengwei Zhang, Kevin Leach, Yu Huang

ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology · 15.07.2026

DOI: 10.1145/3830464 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology, online erschienen am 15.07.2026. Verfasst von Yueke Zhang und 5 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 64 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

GitHub is one of the largest open-source software (OSS) communities for development and collaboration. Impersonation maliciously assuming another user's identity to access code, sway projects, or spread misinformation—has driven recent real-world attacks and is an escalating concern. We present the first exploration of impersonation's impact on GitHub. Through structured interviews with 17 OSS contributors, we study perceptions and mitigations: users generally lack awareness and underestimate the risk; after a live demo, concern rises sharply. Current best practices (e.g., commit signing) need usability improvements to encourage adoption. We also assemble a dataset of 12.5 million commits to examine the current status of impersonation and the feasibility of repository-specific commit authorship attribution as a practical mitigation signal. Leveraging modern pretrained code models and verified commits as cryptographic ground truth, we evaluate whether repository-tuned predictors can infer likely authors and surface anomalous author commit pairs for human review. Models that leverage comprehensive commit information achieve high accuracy (e.g., over 96% with CodeT5+). Our metadata-only CrossCheck analysis shows that apparent author-history discrepancies are dominated by legitimate workflow confounders, so deterministic impersonation detection is unreliable without additional ground truth. We therefore evaluate repository-specific authorship attribution as a probabilistic triage signal, including robustness under a targeted style-imitation attack and open-set deployment considerations where the true author may be absent from the known contributor set. The results show that our approach improves stability over code-only attribution, strengthening its value as a practical triage signal under attacker adaptivity. While deterministic impersonation detection remains impossible, these probabilistic signals can help prioritize review and complement existing controls (e.g., commit signing and vigilant-mode alerts).

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APA

Zhang, Y., Zhang, Y., Wisniewski, P., Zhang, F., Leach, K., & Huang, Y. (2026). Understanding and Detecting GitHub Impersonation through Automated Authorship Attribution. ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology. https://doi.org/10.1145/3830464

Vancouver

Zhang Y, Zhang Y, Wisniewski P, Zhang F, Leach K, Huang Y. Understanding and Detecting GitHub Impersonation through Automated Authorship Attribution. ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology. 2026. doi:10.1145/3830464

BibTeX
@article{Zhang2026,
  author = {Zhang, Yueke and Zhang, Yifan and Wisniewski, Pamela and Zhang, Fengwei and Leach, Kevin and Huang, Yu},
  title = {Understanding and Detecting GitHub Impersonation through Automated Authorship Attribution},
  journal = {ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.1145/3830464}
}
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