KAGE: A Scalable and Efficient Kernel Protection Methods for Linux
ACM Transactions on Architecture and Code Optimization · 30.09.2026 · 23 (3) · 1-25
DOI: 10.1145/3821570 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift ACM Transactions on Architecture and Code Optimization, online erschienen am 23.07.2026. Verfasst von Wenxin Zheng und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 73 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). Gefördert von: National Natural Science Foundation of China, Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities, and the Fundamental and Interdisciplinary Disciplines Breakthrough Plan of the Ministry of Education o….
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Kernel extensibility, while offering flexibility and functionality, introduces significant security risks to the kernel mainly due to the lack of memory safety. However, state of the art approaches are hard to achieve both high efficient address checks and comprehensive memory protection of the kernel memory space from inserted modules at runtime. The recent hardware feature, Memory Protection Keys (MPK), offers a new opportunity to efficiently achieve kernel memory isolation. This article proposes a lightweight memory protection mechanism, namely KAGE , by leveraging runtime memory information and emerging MPK. KAGE tracks the runtime permission switching between kernel and module memory to identify whether a target memory to access is owned by the module or not, which helps in preventing unauthorized memory access outside of the module memory. To mitigate the high overhead introduced by tracking the permission of all memory addresses, KAGE leverages MPK, to monitor the switching of protection domains between modules and the kernel and to check the permission during access. KAGE further addresses three challenges of using MPK in the kernel: supporting variable-sized kernel objects with page-sized granularity MPK, providing control flow integrity in kernel and protecting MPK integrity. Experimental results show that KAGE incurs a minimal overhead of up to 2% when isolating 10GbE network driver and ext4 file system.
Förderung
- National Natural Science Foundation of China
- Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities, and the Fundamental and Interdisciplinary Disciplines Breakthrough Plan of the Ministry of Education o…
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APA
Zheng, W., Zhou, L., Shi, J., & Gu, J. (2026). KAGE: A Scalable and Efficient Kernel Protection Methods for Linux. ACM Transactions on Architecture and Code Optimization, 23(3), 1-25. https://doi.org/10.1145/3821570
Vancouver
Zheng W, Zhou L, Shi J, Gu J. KAGE: A Scalable and Efficient Kernel Protection Methods for Linux. ACM Transactions on Architecture and Code Optimization. 2026;23(3):1-25. doi:10.1145/3821570
BibTeX
@article{Zheng2026,
author = {Zheng, Wenxin and Zhou, Luyan and Shi, Jiacheng and Gu, Jinyu},
title = {KAGE: A Scalable and Efficient Kernel Protection Methods for Linux},
journal = {ACM Transactions on Architecture and Code Optimization},
year = {2026},
volume = {23},
number = {3},
pages = {1--25},
doi = {10.1145/3821570}
}
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