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Open Access · CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

DeFiTrace: Event-Enriched Detection of Price Oracle Manipulation Across DeFi Transactions

Millati Pratiwi, Yoon-Ho Choi

ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security · 31.08.2026 · 29 (3) · 1-28

DOI: 10.1145/3817054 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security, online erschienen am 11.06.2026. Verfasst von Millati Pratiwi und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 32 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). Gefördert von: IITP (Institute of Information and Communications Technology Planning and Evaluation)-ITRC.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

The rapid growth of Decentralized Finance (DeFi) has been accompanied by increasingly sophisticated security threats. Price Oracle Manipulation Attacks (POMA), a critical vulnerability, have evolved beyond simple economic exploits to include complex, multi-transaction attacks that exploit smart contract logic, causing hundreds of millions in losses. State-of-the-art detection methods, however, often focus on single-transaction, economic manipulations and typically fail to identify these emerging attack vectors, particularly when smart contract source code is unavailable. This article introduces a novel, EVM-compatible detection pipeline that addresses this gap. By combining transaction event logs and execution traces, we engineer a rich set of semantic and structural features that capture the underlying behavior of on-chain operations. We train a regularized autoencoder exclusively on the features of benign transactions to learn a deep representation of normal activity, flagging significant deviations as malicious. Our evaluation demonstrates the effectiveness of this approach, achieving 100% recall on a comprehensive dataset of single-transaction attacks and 98.25% event-level recall on a new, manually collected dataset of real-world multi-transaction exploits, with an overall precision of 97.15%. We present a robust, learning-based model capable of identifying both known and unseen POMA variants without relying on source code. Furthermore, we contribute a new dataset of multi-transaction attacks to foster further research, providing a more generalizable and resilient approach to securing the DeFi ecosystem.

Förderung

  • IITP (Institute of Information and Communications Technology Planning and Evaluation)-ITRC

Zitieren

APA

Pratiwi, M., & Choi, Y. (2026). DeFiTrace: Event-Enriched Detection of Price Oracle Manipulation Across DeFi Transactions. ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security, 29(3), 1-28. https://doi.org/10.1145/3817054

Vancouver

Pratiwi M, Choi Y. DeFiTrace: Event-Enriched Detection of Price Oracle Manipulation Across DeFi Transactions. ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security. 2026;29(3):1-28. doi:10.1145/3817054

BibTeX
@article{Pratiwi2026,
  author = {Pratiwi, Millati and Choi, Yoon-Ho},
  title = {DeFiTrace: Event-Enriched Detection of Price Oracle Manipulation Across DeFi Transactions},
  journal = {ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {29},
  number = {3},
  pages = {1--28},
  doi = {10.1145/3817054}
}
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