Characterizing Trust Boundary Vulnerabilities in TEE Container Systems: An Empirical Study
Proceedings of the ACM on Software Engineering · 30.06.2026 · 3 (FSE) · 3439-3462
DOI: 10.1145/3808159 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Proceedings of the ACM on Software Engineering, online erschienen am 30.06.2026. Verfasst von Weijie Liu und 9 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 107 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) have become a cornerstone of confidential computing, attracting significant attention from academia and industry. To support secure and scalable application deployment on confidential clouds, TEE containers (Tcons) have been introduced as middleware to shield applications from malicious operating systems and orchestration layers while preserving usability. In this paper, we present the first comprehensive analysis of Tcons, focusing on three critical layers: OS interfaces, encrypted I/O, and orchestration mechanisms. To enable systematic evaluation, we design TBouncer, an automated analyzer that precisely exercises and benchmarks Tcon isolation boundaries. Our study uncovers fundamental flaws in existing Tcons, leading to exploitable vulnerabilities such as code execution, denial-of-service, and information leakage. In total, we identify six attack vectors, twelve new bugs, and three CVEs. These findings provide new insights into the underestimated attack surface of Tcons and highlight key directions for building more secure and trustworthy container solutions.
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APA
Liu, W., Chen, H., Huai, S., Xu, Z., Wang, W., Wang, X., Zhang, D., Li, Z., Tang, H., & Liu, Z. (2026). Characterizing Trust Boundary Vulnerabilities in TEE Container Systems: An Empirical Study. Proceedings of the ACM on Software Engineering, 3(FSE), 3439-3462. https://doi.org/10.1145/3808159
Vancouver
Liu W, Chen H, Huai S, Xu Z, Wang W, Wang X, et al. Characterizing Trust Boundary Vulnerabilities in TEE Container Systems: An Empirical Study. Proceedings of the ACM on Software Engineering. 2026;3(FSE):3439-3462. doi:10.1145/3808159
BibTeX
@article{Liu2026,
author = {Liu, Weijie and Chen, Hongbo and Huai, Shuo and Xu, Zhen and Wang, Wenhao and Wang, XiaoFeng and Zhang, Danfeng and Li, Zhi and Tang, Haixu and Liu, Zheli},
title = {Characterizing Trust Boundary Vulnerabilities in TEE Container Systems: An Empirical Study},
journal = {Proceedings of the ACM on Software Engineering},
year = {2026},
volume = {3},
number = {FSE},
pages = {3439--3462},
doi = {10.1145/3808159}
}
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