SENTRY: Protecting System-on-Chip Designs against Supply-Chain Attacks
ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems · 31.05.2026 · 25 (3) · 1-25
DOI: 10.1145/3797869 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems, online erschienen am 15.04.2026. Verfasst von Kshitij Raj und 4 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 48 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Automatic Implementation of Secure Silicon, National Science Foundation through NSF.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
System-on-chip security architecture is a critical, complex, and time-consuming activity, consuming months of effort. Furthermore, the architectural design can include subtle errors that compromise the security of the entire system. In this article, we develop a security engine infrastructure, SEnTry , for systematically creating security architectures for protecting SoC designs against a variety of security subversions. SEnTry provides a plug-and-play, configurable subsystem composed of custom IPs that can be integrated into the platform to derive different security primitives. We develop an instance of SEnTry for supply-chain attacks. We discuss the spectrum of challenges involved in developing a unified architecture for systematic protection against the variety of attacks involved and the SEnTry approach to addressing them. We provide several case studies to demonstrate SEnTry design and perform extensive experiments to evaluate its overhead on multiple ASIC technologies. Our experiments suggest that SEnTry incurs minimal overhead in area and power consumption.
Förderung
- Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
- Automatic Implementation of Secure Silicon
- National Science Foundation through NSF
Zitieren
APA
Raj, K., Chatterjee, A., Slpsk, P., Bhunia, S., & Ray, S. (2026). SENTRY: Protecting System-on-Chip Designs against Supply-Chain Attacks. ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems, 25(3), 1-25. https://doi.org/10.1145/3797869
Vancouver
Raj K, Chatterjee A, Slpsk P, Bhunia S, Ray S. SENTRY: Protecting System-on-Chip Designs against Supply-Chain Attacks. ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems. 2026;25(3):1-25. doi:10.1145/3797869
BibTeX
@article{Raj2026,
author = {Raj, Kshitij and Chatterjee, Atri and Slpsk, Patanjali and Bhunia, Swarup and Ray, Sandip},
title = {SENTRY: Protecting System-on-Chip Designs against Supply-Chain Attacks},
journal = {ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems},
year = {2026},
volume = {25},
number = {3},
pages = {1--25},
doi = {10.1145/3797869}
}
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