Strategic Pricing and Ranking in Recommendation Systems with Seller Competition
ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review · 31.03.2026 · 53 (4) · 26-27
DOI: 10.1145/3797823.3797835 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review, online erschienen am 31.03.2026. Verfasst von Tushar Shankar Walunj und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 7 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We study recommendation systems where sellers compete for visibility by o?ering commissions to a platform that curates a personalized ranked menu and sets item prices. Customers interact with the menu under a cascade click model (e.g., as in [1, 3]), scanning the items sequentially from top to bottom. The seller–platform interaction is formulated as a Stackelberg game with sellers as leaders and the platform as a follower. We consider two variants: in the Order and Pricing (OP) game, the platform chooses both ranking and prices, while in the Order at Set-Prices (OS) game, sellers pre-fix prices and the platform decides only the ranking.
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APA
Walunj, T. S., Kavitha, V., Nair, J., & Agarwal, P. (2026). Strategic Pricing and Ranking in Recommendation Systems with Seller Competition. ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review, 53(4), 26-27. https://doi.org/10.1145/3797823.3797835
Vancouver
Walunj TS, Kavitha V, Nair J, Agarwal P. Strategic Pricing and Ranking in Recommendation Systems with Seller Competition. ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review. 2026;53(4):26-27. doi:10.1145/3797823.3797835
BibTeX
@article{Walunj2026,
author = {Walunj, Tushar Shankar and Kavitha, Veeraruna and Nair, Jayakrishnan and Agarwal, Priyank},
title = {Strategic Pricing and Ranking in Recommendation Systems with Seller Competition},
journal = {ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review},
year = {2026},
volume = {53},
number = {4},
pages = {26--27},
doi = {10.1145/3797823.3797835}
}
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