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Open Access · CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

InDe-LLM: Defending against Jailbreak Attacks in LLM-Powered Systems via Intention Disentangling

Yujue Wang, Quan Zhang, Chijin Zhou, Gwihwan Go, Dalong Shi, Yu Jiang

Proceedings of the ACM on Software Engineering · 30.06.2026 · 3 (FSE) · 899-919

DOI: 10.1145/3797136 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Proceedings of the ACM on Software Engineering, online erschienen am 30.06.2026. Verfasst von Yujue Wang und 5 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 55 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Jailbreak attacks have been regarded as a crucial threat to LLM-powered software systems. Recent studies indicate the existence of a steering vector within models' internal activations, which can adjust a model's propensity to reject user requests, and thus is regarded as an effective approach for training-free defense. However, attackers may wrap their malicious intentions within a seemingly benign context, which shifts the distribution of harmful prompts toward benign inputs along the steering vector, effectively bypassing existing defense approaches. In this work, we propose a defense framework InDe-LLM based on intention disentangling. By projecting the embedding of inputs into a benign-invariant subspace, we could disentangle the harmful intentions of jailbreak prompts without affecting benign inputs. Next, such disentangled harmful intentions can be easily identified based on LLMs' well-aligned concept of harmfulness, and rejected through activation steering. Our experiments show that InDe-LLM achieves high defense effectiveness, outperforming baselines by 27.2%–43.5% across three models and ten attacks while preserving high utility on benign inputs. Moreover, our evaluation demonstrates that it exhibits high transferability to unseen attacks.

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APA

Wang, Y., Zhang, Q., Zhou, C., Go, G., Shi, D., & Jiang, Y. (2026). InDe-LLM: Defending against Jailbreak Attacks in LLM-Powered Systems via Intention Disentangling. Proceedings of the ACM on Software Engineering, 3(FSE), 899-919. https://doi.org/10.1145/3797136

Vancouver

Wang Y, Zhang Q, Zhou C, Go G, Shi D, Jiang Y. InDe-LLM: Defending against Jailbreak Attacks in LLM-Powered Systems via Intention Disentangling. Proceedings of the ACM on Software Engineering. 2026;3(FSE):899-919. doi:10.1145/3797136

BibTeX
@article{Wang2026,
  author = {Wang, Yujue and Zhang, Quan and Zhou, Chijin and Go, Gwihwan and Shi, Dalong and Jiang, Yu},
  title = {InDe-LLM: Defending against Jailbreak Attacks in LLM-Powered Systems via Intention Disentangling},
  journal = {Proceedings of the ACM on Software Engineering},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {3},
  number = {FSE},
  pages = {899--919},
  doi = {10.1145/3797136}
}
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