The Last Survivor of PoS Pools: Staker's Dilemma
Proceedings of the ACM on Measurement and Analysis of Computing Systems · 06.03.2025 · 9 (1) · 1-29
DOI: 10.1145/3711704 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Proceedings of the ACM on Measurement and Analysis of Computing Systems, online erschienen am 10.03.2025. Verfasst von Yuming Huang und 5 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 3-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 61 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: Guangzhou Industrial Information and Intelligent Key Laboratory Project, Guangdong Basic and Applied Basic Research Foundation, Guangzhou Municipal Science and Technology Bureau.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
In blockchains using the Proof-of-Work (PoW) consensus mechanism, a mining pool is a joint group of miners who combine their computational resources and share the generated revenue. Similarly, when the Proof-of-Stake (PoS) consensus mechanism is adopted, the staking pool imitates the design of the mining pool by aggregating the stakes. However, in PoW blockchains, the pooling approach has been criticized to be vulnerable to the block withholding (BWH) attack. BWH attackers may steal the dividends from victims by pretending to work but making invalid contributions to the victim pools. It is well known that BWH attackers against PoW face the miner's dilemma . To our knowledge, despite the popularity of PoS, we are the first to study the pool BWH attack against PoS. Interestingly, we find that, for a network only consisting of one attacker pool and one victim pool, the attacker will eventually manipulate the network while the victim will vanish by losing the stake ratio gradually. Moreover, in a more realistic scenario with multiple BWH attacker pools and one solo staker who does not join any pools, we show that only one lucky attacker and the solo staker will survive, whereas all the other pools will vanish gradually, revealing the staker's dilemma . These findings indicate that, compared to PoW, the BWH attack on PoS has a much more severe impact due to the attacker's resource aggregation advantage. Our analysis is supported by experiments on massive real blockchain systems and numerical simulations.
Förderung
- Guangzhou Industrial Information and Intelligent Key Laboratory Project
- Guangdong Basic and Applied Basic Research Foundation
- Guangzhou Municipal Science and Technology Bureau
- Guangzhou Municipal Key Laboratory of Financial Technology Cutting-Edge Research
- National Key R&D Program of China
- Guangzhou Municipality Big Data Intelligence Key Lab
- National Natural Science Foundation of China
Zitieren
APA
Huang, Y., Tang, J., Cong, Q., Ma, R. T. B., Chen, L., & Chee, Y. M. (2025). The Last Survivor of PoS Pools: Staker's Dilemma. Proceedings of the ACM on Measurement and Analysis of Computing Systems, 9(1), 1-29. https://doi.org/10.1145/3711704
Vancouver
Huang Y, Tang J, Cong Q, Ma RTB, Chen L, Chee YM. The Last Survivor of PoS Pools: Staker's Dilemma. Proceedings of the ACM on Measurement and Analysis of Computing Systems. 2025;9(1):1-29. doi:10.1145/3711704
BibTeX
@article{Huang2025,
author = {Huang, Yuming and Tang, Jing and Cong, Qianhao and Ma, Richard T. B. and Chen, Lei and Chee, Yeow Meng},
title = {The Last Survivor of PoS Pools: Staker's Dilemma},
journal = {Proceedings of the ACM on Measurement and Analysis of Computing Systems},
year = {2025},
volume = {9},
number = {1},
pages = {1--29},
doi = {10.1145/3711704}
}
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