Blockchain-based Decentralized Reward Sharing: The Case of Mining Pools
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation · 31.03.2024 · 12 (1) · 1-26
DOI: 10.1145/3641120 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, online erschienen am 11.03.2024. Verfasst von Jens Gudmundsson und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 4-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 95 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: Carlsberg Foundation.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We introduce a reciprocity protocol , an innovative approach to coordinating and sharing rewards in blockchains. Inherently decentralized and implementable, it puts emphasis on incentives rather than forcing specific sharing rules from the outset. Analyzing the non-cooperative game the protocol induces, we identify a robust, strict, and Pareto-dominant symmetric equilibrium. In it, even self-centered participants show extensive systemic reciprocity. Thus, despite a setting that is generally unfavorable to reciprocal behavior, the protocol enables users to build trust between themselves by taking on a role akin to a social contract.
Förderung
- Carlsberg Foundation
Zitieren
APA
Gudmundsson, J., & Hougaard, J. L. (2024). Blockchain-based Decentralized Reward Sharing: The Case of Mining Pools. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 12(1), 1-26. https://doi.org/10.1145/3641120
Vancouver
Gudmundsson J, Hougaard JL. Blockchain-based Decentralized Reward Sharing: The Case of Mining Pools. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation. 2024;12(1):1-26. doi:10.1145/3641120
BibTeX
@article{Gudmundsson2024,
author = {Gudmundsson, Jens and Hougaard, Jens Leth},
title = {Blockchain-based Decentralized Reward Sharing: The Case of Mining Pools},
journal = {ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation},
year = {2024},
volume = {12},
number = {1},
pages = {1--26},
doi = {10.1145/3641120}
}
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