Anchor: A Library for Building Secure Persistent Memory Systems
Proceedings of the ACM on Management of Data · 08.12.2023 · 1 (4) · 1-31
DOI: 10.1145/3626718 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Proceedings of the ACM on Management of Data, online erschienen am 12.12.2023. Verfasst von Dimitrios Stavrakakis und 5 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 5-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 151 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: UK Research and Innovation (UKRI) & Government Communications Headquarters, European Research Council, Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Cloud infrastructure is experiencing a shift towards disaggregated setups, especially with the introduction of the Compute Express Link (CXL) technology, where byte-addressable ersistent memory (PM) is becoming prominent. To fully utilize the potential of such devices, it is a necessity to access them through network stacks with equivalently high levels of performance (e.g., kernel-bypass, RDMA). While, these advancements are enabling the development of high-performance data management systems, their deployment on untrusted cloud environments also increases the security threats. To this end, we present Anchor, a library for building secure PM systems. Anchor provides strong hardware-assisted security properties, while ensuring crash consistency. Anchor exposes APIs for secure data management within the realms of the established PM programming model, targeting byte-addressable storage devices. Anchor leverages trusted execution environments (TEE) and extends their security properties on PM. While TEE's protected memory region provides a strong foundation for building secure systems, the key challenge is that: TEEs are fundamentally incompatible with PM and kernel-bypass networking approaches-in particular, TEEs are neither designed to protect untrusted non-volatile PM, nor the protected region can be accessed via an untrusted DMA connection. To overcome this challenge, we design a PM engine that ensures strong security properties for the PM data, using confidential and authenticated PM data structures, while preserving crash consistency through a secure logging protocol. We further extend the PM engine to provide remote PM data operations via a secure network stack and a formally verified remote attestation protocol to form an end-to-end system. Our evaluation shows that Anchor incurs reasonable overheads, while providing strong security properties.
Förderung
- UK Research and Innovation (UKRI) & Government Communications Headquarters
- European Research Council
- Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
Zitieren
APA
Stavrakakis, D., Giantsidi, D., Bailleu, M., Sändig, P., Issa, S., & Bhatotia, P. (2023). Anchor: A Library for Building Secure Persistent Memory Systems. Proceedings of the ACM on Management of Data, 1(4), 1-31. https://doi.org/10.1145/3626718
Vancouver
Stavrakakis D, Giantsidi D, Bailleu M, Sändig P, Issa S, Bhatotia P. Anchor: A Library for Building Secure Persistent Memory Systems. Proceedings of the ACM on Management of Data. 2023;1(4):1-31. doi:10.1145/3626718
BibTeX
@article{Stavrakakis2023,
author = {Stavrakakis, Dimitrios and Giantsidi, Dimitra and Bailleu, Maurice and Sändig, Philip and Issa, Shady and Bhatotia, Pramod},
title = {Anchor: A Library for Building Secure Persistent Memory Systems},
journal = {Proceedings of the ACM on Management of Data},
year = {2023},
volume = {1},
number = {4},
pages = {1--31},
doi = {10.1145/3626718}
}
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