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Crossref

Investigating the Security of EV Charging Mobile Applications as an Attack Surface

Khaled Sarieddine, Mohammad Ali Sayed, Sadegh Torabi, Ribal Atallah, Chadi Assi

ACM Transactions on Cyber-Physical Systems · 31.10.2023 · 7 (4) · 1-28

DOI: 10.1145/3609508 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift ACM Transactions on Cyber-Physical Systems, online erschienen am 14.10.2023. Verfasst von Khaled Sarieddine und 4 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 59-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 66 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: Concordia University/Hydro-Quebec/NSERC, Large-scale Integration of EVCSs into the Smart Grid: A Comprehensive Cyber-physical Study and Security Assessment.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

The adoption rate of EVs has witnessed a significant increase in recent years driven by multiple factors, chief among which is the increased flexibility and ease of access to charging infrastructure. To improve user experience and increase system flexibility, mobile applications have been incorporated into the EV charging ecosystem. EV charging mobile applications allow consumers to remotely trigger actions on charging stations and use functionalities such as start/stop charging sessions, pay for usage, and locate charging stations, to name a few. In this article, we study the security posture of the EV charging ecosystem against a new type of remote that exploits vulnerabilities in the EV charging mobile applications as an attack surface. We leverage a combination of static and dynamic analysis techniques to analyze the security of widely used EV charging mobile applications. Our analysis was performed on 31 of the most widely used mobile applications including their interactions with various components such as cloud management systems. The attack scenarios that exploit these vulnerabilities were verified on a real-time co-simulation test bed. Our discoveries indicate the lack of user/vehicle verification and improper authorization for critical functions, which allow adversaries to remotely hijack charging sessions and launch attacks against the connected critical infrastructure. The attacks were demonstrated using the EVCS mobile applications showing the feasibility and the applicability of our attacks. Indeed, we discuss specific remote attack scenarios and their impact on EV users. More importantly, our analysis results demonstrate the feasibility of leveraging existing vulnerabilities across various EV charging mobile applications to perform wide-scale coordinated remote charging/discharging attacks against the connected critical infrastructure (e.g., power grid), with significant economical and operational implications. Finally, we propose countermeasures to secure the infrastructure and impede adversaries from performing reconnaissance and launching remote attacks using compromised accounts.

Förderung

  • Concordia University/Hydro-Quebec/NSERC
  • Large-scale Integration of EVCSs into the Smart Grid: A Comprehensive Cyber-physical Study and Security Assessment

Zitieren

APA

Sarieddine, K., Sayed, M. A., Torabi, S., Atallah, R., & Assi, C. (2023). Investigating the Security of EV Charging Mobile Applications as an Attack Surface. ACM Transactions on Cyber-Physical Systems, 7(4), 1-28. https://doi.org/10.1145/3609508

Vancouver

Sarieddine K, Sayed MA, Torabi S, Atallah R, Assi C. Investigating the Security of EV Charging Mobile Applications as an Attack Surface. ACM Transactions on Cyber-Physical Systems. 2023;7(4):1-28. doi:10.1145/3609508

BibTeX
@article{Sarieddine2023,
  author = {Sarieddine, Khaled and Sayed, Mohammad Ali and Torabi, Sadegh and Atallah, Ribal and Assi, Chadi},
  title = {Investigating the Security of EV Charging Mobile Applications as an Attack Surface},
  journal = {ACM Transactions on Cyber-Physical Systems},
  year = {2023},
  volume = {7},
  number = {4},
  pages = {1--28},
  doi = {10.1145/3609508}
}
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