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Crossref

The Unreasonable Fairness of Maximum Nash Welfare

Ioannis Caragiannis, David Kurokawa, Hervé Moulin, Ariel D. Procaccia, Nisarg Shah, Junxing Wang

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation · 31.08.2019 · 7 (3) · 1-32

DOI: 10.1145/3355902 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, online erschienen am 24.09.2019. Verfasst von Ioannis Caragiannis und 5 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 255-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 43 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: Sloan Research Fellowship, NSERC under the Discovery Grants program, COST Action IC1205 on “Computational Social Choice”.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

The maximum Nash welfare (MNW) solution—which selects an allocation that maximizes the product of utilities—is known to provide outstanding fairness guarantees when allocating divisible goods. And while it seems to lose its luster when applied to indivisible goods, we show that, in fact, the MNW solution is strikingly fair even in that setting. In particular, we prove that it selects allocations that are envy-free up to one good—a compelling notion that is quite elusive when coupled with economic efficiency. We also establish that the MNW solution provides a good approximation to another popular (yet possibly infeasible) fairness property, the maximin share guarantee, in theory and—even more so—in practice. While finding the MNW solution is computationally hard, we develop a nontrivial implementation and demonstrate that it scales well on real data. These results establish MNW as a compelling solution for allocating indivisible goods and underlie its deployment on a popular fair-division website.

Förderung

  • Sloan Research Fellowship
  • NSERC under the Discovery Grants program
  • COST Action IC1205 on “Computational Social Choice”
  • University of Patras
  • Caratheodory research
  • National Science Foundation

Zitieren

APA

Caragiannis, I., Kurokawa, D., Moulin, H., Procaccia, A. D., Shah, N., & Wang, J. (2019). The Unreasonable Fairness of Maximum Nash Welfare. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 7(3), 1-32. https://doi.org/10.1145/3355902

Vancouver

Caragiannis I, Kurokawa D, Moulin H, Procaccia AD, Shah N, Wang J. The Unreasonable Fairness of Maximum Nash Welfare. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation. 2019;7(3):1-32. doi:10.1145/3355902

BibTeX
@article{Caragiannis2019,
  author = {Caragiannis, Ioannis and Kurokawa, David and Moulin, Hervé and Procaccia, Ariel D. and Shah, Nisarg and Wang, Junxing},
  title = {The Unreasonable Fairness of Maximum Nash Welfare},
  journal = {ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation},
  year = {2019},
  volume = {7},
  number = {3},
  pages = {1--32},
  doi = {10.1145/3355902}
}
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