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Crossref

Shielding Applications from an Untrusted Cloud with Haven

Andrew Baumann, Marcus Peinado, Galen Hunt

ACM Transactions on Computer Systems · 11.09.2015 · 33 (3) · 1-26

DOI: 10.1145/2799647 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift ACM Transactions on Computer Systems, online erschienen am 31.08.2015. Verfasst von Andrew Baumann und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 318-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 68 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Today’s cloud computing infrastructure requires substantial trust. Cloud users rely on both the provider’s staff and its globally distributed software/hardware platform not to expose any of their private data. We introduce the notion of shielded execution, which protects the confidentiality and integrity of a program and its data from the platform on which it runs (i.e., the cloud operator’s OS, VM, and firmware). Our prototype, Haven, is the first system to achieve shielded execution of unmodified legacy applications, including SQL Server and Apache, on a commodity OS (Windows) and commodity hardware. Haven leverages the hardware protection of Intel SGX to defend against privileged code and physical attacks such as memory probes, and also addresses the dual challenges of executing unmodified legacy binaries and protecting them from a malicious host. This work motivated recent changes in the SGX specification.

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APA

Baumann, A., Peinado, M., & Hunt, G. (2015). Shielding Applications from an Untrusted Cloud with Haven. ACM Transactions on Computer Systems, 33(3), 1-26. https://doi.org/10.1145/2799647

Vancouver

Baumann A, Peinado M, Hunt G. Shielding Applications from an Untrusted Cloud with Haven. ACM Transactions on Computer Systems. 2015;33(3):1-26. doi:10.1145/2799647

BibTeX
@article{Baumann2015,
  author = {Baumann, Andrew and Peinado, Marcus and Hunt, Galen},
  title = {Shielding Applications from an Untrusted Cloud with Haven},
  journal = {ACM Transactions on Computer Systems},
  year = {2015},
  volume = {33},
  number = {3},
  pages = {1--26},
  doi = {10.1145/2799647}
}
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