Mechanism Design via Consensus Estimates, Cross Checking, and Profit Extraction
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation · 2013
DOI: 10.1145/2465769.2465773 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 2013. Verfasst von Bach Q. Ha und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 5-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 24 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: Division of Computing and Communication Foundations.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
There is only one technique for prior-free optimal mechanism design that generalizes beyond the structurally benevolent setting of digital goods. This technique uses random sampling to estimate the distribution of agent values and then employs the Bayesian optimal mechanism for this estimated distribution on the remaining players. Though quite general, even for digital goods, this random sampling auction has a complicated analysis and is known to be suboptimal. To overcome these issues we generalize the consensus and profit extraction techniques from Goldberg and Hartline [2003] to structurally rich environments that include, for example, single-minded combinatorial auctions.
Förderung
- Division of Computing and Communication Foundations
Zitieren
APA
Ha, B. Q., & Hartline, J. D. (2013). Mechanism Design via Consensus Estimates, Cross Checking, and Profit Extraction. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation. https://doi.org/10.1145/2465769.2465773
Vancouver
Ha BQ, Hartline JD. Mechanism Design via Consensus Estimates, Cross Checking, and Profit Extraction. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation. 2013. doi:10.1145/2465769.2465773
BibTeX
@article{Ha2013,
author = {Ha, Bach Q. and Hartline, Jason D.},
title = {Mechanism Design via Consensus Estimates, Cross Checking, and Profit Extraction},
journal = {ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation},
year = {2013},
doi = {10.1145/2465769.2465773}
}
EUVIMED