Optimal payments in dominant-strategy mechanisms for single-parameter domains
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation · 2013
DOI: 10.1145/2399187.2399191 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 2013. Verfasst von Victor Naroditskiy und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 2-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 21 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: Research Councils UK.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We study dominant-strategy mechanisms in allocation domains where agents have one-dimensional types and quasilinear utilities. Taking an allocation function as an input, we present an algorithmic technique for finding optimal payments in a class of mechanism design problems, including utilitarian and egalitarian allocation of homogeneous items with nondecreasing marginal costs. Our results link optimality of payment functions to a geometric condition involving triangulations of polytopes. When this condition is satisfied, we constructively show the existence of an optimal payment function that is piecewise linear in agent types.
Förderung
- Research Councils UK
Zitieren
APA
Naroditskiy, V., Polukarov, M., & Jennings, N. R. (2013). Optimal payments in dominant-strategy mechanisms for single-parameter domains. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation. https://doi.org/10.1145/2399187.2399191
Vancouver
Naroditskiy V, Polukarov M, Jennings NR. Optimal payments in dominant-strategy mechanisms for single-parameter domains. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation. 2013. doi:10.1145/2399187.2399191
BibTeX
@article{Naroditskiy2013,
author = {Naroditskiy, Victor and Polukarov, Maria and Jennings, Nicholas R.},
title = {Optimal payments in dominant-strategy mechanisms for single-parameter domains},
journal = {ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation},
year = {2013},
doi = {10.1145/2399187.2399191}
}
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