The Driving Forces of Relative CEO to Employee Pay
The Quarterly Journal of Finance · 2026-03 · 16 (01)
DOI: 10.1142/s2010139226500060 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Quarterly Journal of Finance, online erschienen am 11.04.2026. Verfasst von Yixi Ning und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 60 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
In this paper, we examine the driving forces of CEO to median employee pay ratios from a macro-perspective using a sample of large corporations included in the DJIA index from 1949 to 2022. We find that CEO-employee pay ratios increase with the Industry Production Index and inflation rate, but decrease with GDP per capita growth rate, unemployment rate, stock market, and industry trends. Our results also show that CEO pay structure changes from salary and bonus-dominated to option and stock-dominated pay enable CEOs to enjoy a much better pay package compared to lower-level employees, while executive pay-related regulations in the 2000s have lowered CEO-employee pay ratios. Our findings provide new insights to various stakeholders, regulators, the public and media on this long-debated social and economic issue.
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APA
Ning, Y., Garza-Gomez, X., & Wang, H. (2026). The Driving Forces of Relative CEO to Employee Pay. The Quarterly Journal of Finance, 16(01). https://doi.org/10.1142/s2010139226500060
Vancouver
Ning Y, Garza-Gomez X, Wang H. The Driving Forces of Relative CEO to Employee Pay. The Quarterly Journal of Finance. 2026;16(01). doi:10.1142/s2010139226500060
BibTeX
@article{Ning2026,
author = {Ning, Yixi and Garza-Gomez, Xavier and Wang, Hongxia},
title = {The Driving Forces of Relative CEO to Employee Pay},
journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Finance},
year = {2026},
volume = {16},
number = {01},
doi = {10.1142/s2010139226500060}
}
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