CEO Turnover, Information Uncertainty, and Debt Contracting
Quarterly Journal of Finance · 2019-06 · 09 (02) · 1950001
DOI: 10.1142/s2010139219500010 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Quarterly Journal of Finance, online erschienen am 25.03.2019. Verfasst von Saiying Deng und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 5-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 56 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
CEO turnovers are important corporate events that can lead to significant changes within the firm. We find that CEO departures are associated with a subsequent increase in bank loan financing. The negative effect that CEO departures have on borrowing costs is largely driven by forced CEO turnovers. Following such departures, firms pay higher loan spreads, see an increase in covenants, and are more likely to be subject to collateral requirements, when compared to matched non-turnover and voluntary turnover firms. Evidence suggests that asset substitution and changes in accounting information quality help to explain the observed worsened terms following forced dismissals. On the other hand, more traditional voluntary departures are unrelated to changes in price and non-price loan terms.
Zitieren
APA
Deng, S., Intintoli, V. J., & Zhang, A. (2019). CEO Turnover, Information Uncertainty, and Debt Contracting. Quarterly Journal of Finance, 09(02), 1950001. https://doi.org/10.1142/s2010139219500010
Vancouver
Deng S, Intintoli VJ, Zhang A. CEO Turnover, Information Uncertainty, and Debt Contracting. Quarterly Journal of Finance. 2019;09(02):1950001. doi:10.1142/s2010139219500010
BibTeX
@article{Deng2019,
author = {Deng, Saiying and Intintoli, Vincent J. and Zhang, Andrew},
title = {CEO Turnover, Information Uncertainty, and Debt Contracting},
journal = {Quarterly Journal of Finance},
year = {2019},
volume = {09},
number = {02},
pages = {1950001},
doi = {10.1142/s2010139219500010}
}
EUVIMED