Herding and Delegated Portfolio Management: The Impact of Relative Performance Evaluation on Asset Allocation
Quarterly Journal of Finance · 2011
DOI: 10.1142/s2010139211000092 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Quarterly Journal of Finance, 2011. Verfasst von Ernst Maug und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 71-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 24 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper investigates the effect of fund managers' performance evaluation on their asset allocation decisions. We derive optimal contracts for delegated portfolio management and show that they always contain relative performance elements. We then show that this biases fund managers to deviate from return-maximizing portfolio allocations and follow those of their benchmark (herding). In many cases, the trustees of the fund who employ the fund manager prefer such a policy. We also show that fund managers in some situations ignore their own superior information and "go with the flow" in order to reduce deviations from their benchmark. We conclude that incentive provisions for portfolio managers are an important factor in their asset allocation decisions.
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APA
Maug, E., & Naik, N. (2011). Herding and Delegated Portfolio Management: The Impact of Relative Performance Evaluation on Asset Allocation. Quarterly Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1142/s2010139211000092
Vancouver
Maug E, Naik N. Herding and Delegated Portfolio Management: The Impact of Relative Performance Evaluation on Asset Allocation. Quarterly Journal of Finance. 2011. doi:10.1142/s2010139211000092
BibTeX
@article{Maug2011,
author = {Maug, Ernst and Naik, Narayan},
title = {Herding and Delegated Portfolio Management: The Impact of Relative Performance Evaluation on Asset Allocation},
journal = {Quarterly Journal of Finance},
year = {2011},
doi = {10.1142/s2010139211000092}
}
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