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Strategic Analysis of Risk-Shifting Incentives with Convertible Debt

Pascal François, Georges Hübner, Nicolas Papageorgiou

Quarterly Journal of Finance · 2011

DOI: 10.1142/s2010139211000079 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Quarterly Journal of Finance, 2011. Verfasst von Pascal François und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 6-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 32 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Convertible debt eliminates asset substitution in a one-period setting (Green, 1984). But convertible debt terms are usually set before the asset substitution opportunity. This allows shareholders and convertible debtholders to play a strategic noncooperative game. Two risk-shifting Nash equilibria are attainable: pure asset substitution when, despite no conversion, shareholders benefit from shifting risk, and strategic conversion when, despite early conversion, convertible debtholders expropriate wealth from straight debtholders. Even when initial convertible debt is designed to minimize the risk-shifting likelihood, the risk of asset substitution remains economically substantial — contrasting with the agency theoretic rationale for issuing convertible debt.

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APA

François, P., Hübner, G., & Papageorgiou, N. (2011). Strategic Analysis of Risk-Shifting Incentives with Convertible Debt. Quarterly Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1142/s2010139211000079

Vancouver

François P, Hübner G, Papageorgiou N. Strategic Analysis of Risk-Shifting Incentives with Convertible Debt. Quarterly Journal of Finance. 2011. doi:10.1142/s2010139211000079

BibTeX
@article{Franois2011,
  author = {François, Pascal and Hübner, Georges and Papageorgiou, Nicolas},
  title = {Strategic Analysis of Risk-Shifting Incentives with Convertible Debt},
  journal = {Quarterly Journal of Finance},
  year = {2011},
  doi = {10.1142/s2010139211000079}
}
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