Posted Prices with Information-Compatible Feasibility in Bayesian Wardrop Congestion Games
International Game Theory Review · 10.11.2026
DOI: 10.1142/s0219198926500271 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift International Game Theory Review, online erschienen am 10.11.2026. Verfasst von Takashi Matsuhisa.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
In this paper, we study finite-state nonatomic congestion games with posted prices, average assignment budgets and information-measurable policies. Statewise affordability need not permit a policy that satisfies every budget inequality on an information cell. A cellwise minimax threshold characterizes feasibility and yields an infeasibility certificate. On a nonempty feasible domain, continuity gives a price–budget rational-expectations Wardrop equilibrium; polyhedral normal cones give necessary and sufficient cellwise Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) conditions, including degenerate domains. Three planning benchmarks separate equilibrium, information and budget losses. An explicit comparison-cost distortion yields efficiency bounds and recovers the sharp affine bound [Formula: see text]. The model evaluates technology at conditional mean loads, a convention distinguished from expected realized costs. A diagnostic appendix proves parameter-continuity results under explicit assumptions and gives consistent examples of feasibility, tariff, complementarity and information changes.
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APA
Matsuhisa, T. (2026). Posted Prices with Information-Compatible Feasibility in Bayesian Wardrop Congestion Games. International Game Theory Review. https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198926500271
Vancouver
Matsuhisa T. Posted Prices with Information-Compatible Feasibility in Bayesian Wardrop Congestion Games. International Game Theory Review. 2026. doi:10.1142/s0219198926500271
BibTeX
@article{Matsuhisa2026,
author = {Matsuhisa, Takashi},
title = {Posted Prices with Information-Compatible Feasibility in Bayesian Wardrop Congestion Games},
journal = {International Game Theory Review},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1142/s0219198926500271}
}
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