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Revisiting Stackelberg in His Own Light: Conjecture Learning in Leader–Follower Games

Denis Claude, Mabel Tidball

International Game Theory Review · 2026-12 · 28 (04)

DOI: 10.1142/s0219198926500039 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift International Game Theory Review, online erschienen am 22.04.2026. Verfasst von Denis Claude und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 30 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: Agence Nationale de la Recherche, Conseil régional de Bourgogne-Franche-Comté.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

This paper revisits Heinrich F. von Stackelberg’s original description of leader–follower games under incomplete information, exploring how learning dynamics shape strategic interaction. The leader iteratively updates its conjecture about the follower’s reaction function before choosing an activity level that maximizes its payoff. The follower, in turn, responds optimally to each activity level, revealing information that the leader uses to refine its conjecture. Assuming linear conjectures, a smooth updating process à la [Jean-Marie, A. and Tidball, M. [2006] Adapting behaviors through a learning process, J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 60, 399–422, doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2004.02.007], and quadratic payoff functions, we establish conditions under which the learning process converges asymptotically to a self-confirming steady-state. We characterize the resulting activity levels and payoffs in two canonical environments: a sequential partnership game and a sequential duopoly game with quantity competition. We then compare the learning outcomes to both the (complete information) Stackelberg and the cartel solution. In the process, we find conditions under which the lack of information and the resulting strategic ambiguity lead to higher joint payoffs, and under which usual intuitions about the first-mover advantage need qualifications.

Förderung

  • Agence Nationale de la Recherche
  • Conseil régional de Bourgogne-Franche-Comté

Zitieren

APA

Claude, D., & Tidball, M. (2026). Revisiting Stackelberg in His Own Light: Conjecture Learning in Leader–Follower Games. International Game Theory Review, 28(04). https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198926500039

Vancouver

Claude D, Tidball M. Revisiting Stackelberg in His Own Light: Conjecture Learning in Leader–Follower Games. International Game Theory Review. 2026;28(04). doi:10.1142/s0219198926500039

BibTeX
@article{Claude2026,
  author = {Claude, Denis and Tidball, Mabel},
  title = {Revisiting Stackelberg in His Own Light: Conjecture Learning in Leader–Follower Games},
  journal = {International Game Theory Review},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {28},
  number = {04},
  doi = {10.1142/s0219198926500039}
}
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