Revisiting Stackelberg in His Own Light: Conjecture Learning in Leader–Follower Games
International Game Theory Review · 2026-12 · 28 (04)
DOI: 10.1142/s0219198926500039 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift International Game Theory Review, online erschienen am 22.04.2026. Verfasst von Denis Claude und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 30 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: Agence Nationale de la Recherche, Conseil régional de Bourgogne-Franche-Comté.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper revisits Heinrich F. von Stackelberg’s original description of leader–follower games under incomplete information, exploring how learning dynamics shape strategic interaction. The leader iteratively updates its conjecture about the follower’s reaction function before choosing an activity level that maximizes its payoff. The follower, in turn, responds optimally to each activity level, revealing information that the leader uses to refine its conjecture. Assuming linear conjectures, a smooth updating process à la [Jean-Marie, A. and Tidball, M. [2006] Adapting behaviors through a learning process, J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 60, 399–422, doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2004.02.007], and quadratic payoff functions, we establish conditions under which the learning process converges asymptotically to a self-confirming steady-state. We characterize the resulting activity levels and payoffs in two canonical environments: a sequential partnership game and a sequential duopoly game with quantity competition. We then compare the learning outcomes to both the (complete information) Stackelberg and the cartel solution. In the process, we find conditions under which the lack of information and the resulting strategic ambiguity lead to higher joint payoffs, and under which usual intuitions about the first-mover advantage need qualifications.
Förderung
- Agence Nationale de la Recherche
- Conseil régional de Bourgogne-Franche-Comté
Zitieren
APA
Claude, D., & Tidball, M. (2026). Revisiting Stackelberg in His Own Light: Conjecture Learning in Leader–Follower Games. International Game Theory Review, 28(04). https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198926500039
Vancouver
Claude D, Tidball M. Revisiting Stackelberg in His Own Light: Conjecture Learning in Leader–Follower Games. International Game Theory Review. 2026;28(04). doi:10.1142/s0219198926500039
BibTeX
@article{Claude2026,
author = {Claude, Denis and Tidball, Mabel},
title = {Revisiting Stackelberg in His Own Light: Conjecture Learning in Leader–Follower Games},
journal = {International Game Theory Review},
year = {2026},
volume = {28},
number = {04},
doi = {10.1142/s0219198926500039}
}
EUVIMED