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Dynkin Ghost Games with Asymmetry and Consolation

Erik Ekström, Yuqiong Wang

SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization · 30.06.2026 · 64 (3) · 1507-1521

DOI: 10.1137/24m1708498 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization, online erschienen am 27.05.2026. Verfasst von Erik Ekström und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 21 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

We study a stopping game of preemption type between two players who both act under uncertain competition. In this framework we introduce, and study the effect of, (i) asymmetry of payoffs, allowing, e.g., for different investment costs, and (ii) consolation, i.e., partial compensation to the forestalled stopper. In general, this setting does not offer an explicit equilibrium. Instead, we provide a general verification theorem, which we then use to explore various situations in which a solution can be constructed so that an equilibrium is obtained.

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APA

Ekström, E., & Wang, Y. (2026). Dynkin Ghost Games with Asymmetry and Consolation. SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization, 64(3), 1507-1521. https://doi.org/10.1137/24m1708498

Vancouver

Ekström E, Wang Y. Dynkin Ghost Games with Asymmetry and Consolation. SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization. 2026;64(3):1507-1521. doi:10.1137/24m1708498

BibTeX
@article{Ekstrm2026,
  author = {Ekström, Erik and Wang, Yuqiong},
  title = {Dynkin Ghost Games with Asymmetry and Consolation},
  journal = {SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {64},
  number = {3},
  pages = {1507--1521},
  doi = {10.1137/24m1708498}
}
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