Dynkin Ghost Games with Asymmetry and Consolation
SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization · 30.06.2026 · 64 (3) · 1507-1521
DOI: 10.1137/24m1708498 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization, online erschienen am 27.05.2026. Verfasst von Erik Ekström und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 21 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We study a stopping game of preemption type between two players who both act under uncertain competition. In this framework we introduce, and study the effect of, (i) asymmetry of payoffs, allowing, e.g., for different investment costs, and (ii) consolation, i.e., partial compensation to the forestalled stopper. In general, this setting does not offer an explicit equilibrium. Instead, we provide a general verification theorem, which we then use to explore various situations in which a solution can be constructed so that an equilibrium is obtained.
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APA
Ekström, E., & Wang, Y. (2026). Dynkin Ghost Games with Asymmetry and Consolation. SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization, 64(3), 1507-1521. https://doi.org/10.1137/24m1708498
Vancouver
Ekström E, Wang Y. Dynkin Ghost Games with Asymmetry and Consolation. SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization. 2026;64(3):1507-1521. doi:10.1137/24m1708498
BibTeX
@article{Ekstrm2026,
author = {Ekström, Erik and Wang, Yuqiong},
title = {Dynkin Ghost Games with Asymmetry and Consolation},
journal = {SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization},
year = {2026},
volume = {64},
number = {3},
pages = {1507--1521},
doi = {10.1137/24m1708498}
}
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