An \({\alpha }\)-Potential Game Framework for \( {N}\)-Player Dynamic Games
SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization · 31.08.2025 · 63 (4) · 2964-3005
DOI: 10.1137/24m1707316 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization, online erschienen am 20.08.2025. Verfasst von Xin Guo und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 5-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 47 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper proposes and studies a general form of dynamic [Formula: see text]-player noncooperative games called [Formula: see text]-potential games, where the change of a player’s objective function upon her unilateral deviation from her strategy is equal to the change of an [Formula: see text]-potential function up to an error [Formula: see text]. Analogous to the static potential game (which corresponds to [Formula: see text]), the [Formula: see text]-potential game framework is shown to reduce the challenging task of finding [Formula: see text]-Nash equilibria for a dynamic game to minimizing the [Formula: see text]-potential function. Moreover, an analytical characterization of [Formula: see text]-potential functions is established, with [Formula: see text] represented in terms of the magnitude of the asymmetry of objective functions’ second-order derivatives. For stochastic differential games in which the state dynamic is a controlled diffusion, [Formula: see text] is characterized in terms of the number of players, the choice of admissible strategies, and the intensity of interactions and the level of heterogeneity among players. Two classes of stochastic differential games, namely, distributed games and games with mean field interactions, are analyzed to highlight the dependence of [Formula: see text] on general game characteristics that are beyond the mean field paradigm, which focuses on the limit of [Formula: see text] with homogeneous players. To analyze the [Formula: see text]-NE (Nash equilibrium), the associated optimization problem is embedded into a conditional McKean–Vlasov control problem. A verification theorem is established to construct [Formula: see text]-NE based on solutions to an infinite-dimensional Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation, which is reduced to a system of ordinary differential equations for linear-quadratic games.
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APA
Guo, X., Li, X., & Zhang, Y. (2025). An \({\alpha }\)-Potential Game Framework for \( {N}\)-Player Dynamic Games. SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization, 63(4), 2964-3005. https://doi.org/10.1137/24m1707316
Vancouver
Guo X, Li X, Zhang Y. An \({\alpha }\)-Potential Game Framework for \( {N}\)-Player Dynamic Games. SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization. 2025;63(4):2964-3005. doi:10.1137/24m1707316
BibTeX
@article{Guo2025,
author = {Guo, Xin and Li, Xinyu and Zhang, Yufei},
title = {An \(\alpha \)-Potential Game Framework for \( N\)-Player Dynamic Games},
journal = {SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization},
year = {2025},
volume = {63},
number = {4},
pages = {2964--3005},
doi = {10.1137/24m1707316}
}
EUVIMED