Long Range Games
SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization · 31.08.2026 · 64 (4) · 2917-2946
DOI: 10.1137/24m1697451 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization, online erschienen am 27.07.2026. Verfasst von Francesca Albertini und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 30 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We consider [Formula: see text]-player games, in continuous time, finite state space, and finite time horizon, on a geometrical structure possessing a macroscopic limit in a suitable sense. This geometrical structure breaks the permutation invariance property that gives rise to mean field games. The corresponding limit game is a variant of mean field games that we call a long range game. We prove that this asymptotic scheme satisfies the following key properties: (a) the long range game admits at least one equilibrium; (b) this equilibrium is unique under a suitable monotonicity condition; (c) the feedback corresponding to any equilibrium of the long range game is a quasi-Nash equilibrium for the [Formula: see text]-player games. We finally show that this scheme includes several examples of interaction mechanisms, in particular, Kac-type interactions and interactions on generalized Erdös–Renyi graphs.
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APA
Albertini, F., & Pra, P. D. (2026). Long Range Games. SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization, 64(4), 2917-2946. https://doi.org/10.1137/24m1697451
Vancouver
Albertini F, Pra PD. Long Range Games. SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization. 2026;64(4):2917-2946. doi:10.1137/24m1697451
BibTeX
@article{Albertini2026,
author = {Albertini, Francesca and Pra, Paolo Dai},
title = {Long Range Games},
journal = {SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization},
year = {2026},
volume = {64},
number = {4},
pages = {2917--2946},
doi = {10.1137/24m1697451}
}
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