EUVIMEDEUVIMED entdecken
Crossref

A Unified Framework for Pricing in Nonconvex Resource Allocation Games

Tobias Harks, Julian Schwarz

SIAM Journal on Optimization · 30.06.2023 · 33 (2) · 1223-1249

DOI: 10.1137/21m1400924 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift SIAM Journal on Optimization, online erschienen am 26.06.2023. Verfasst von Tobias Harks und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 4-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 51 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

We consider a basic nonconvex resource allocation game, where the players’ strategy spaces are subsets of [Formula: see text] and cost functions are parameterized by some common vector [Formula: see text] and, otherwise, only depend on their own strategy choice. A strategy of a player can be interpreted as a vector of resource consumption and a joint strategy profile naturally leads to an aggregate consumption vector. Resources can be priced, that is, the game is augmented by a price vector [Formula: see text] and players have quasi-linear overall costs, meaning that in addition to the original costs, a player needs to pay the corresponding price per consumed unit. We investigate the following question: for which aggregated consumption vectors [Formula: see text] can we find prices [Formula: see text] that induce an equilibrium realizing the targeted consumption profile? For answering this question, we revisit a duality-based framework and derive a new characterization of the existence of such [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text] using convexification techniques. Our characterization implies the following result: If strategy spaces of players are bounded linear mixed-integer sets and the cost functions are linear or even concave, the equilibrium existence problem reduces to solving a well-structured LP. We then consider aggregate formulations assuming that cost functions are additive over resources and homogeneous among players. We derive a characterization of enforceable consumption vectors [Formula: see text], showing that [Formula: see text] is enforceable if and only if [Formula: see text] is a minimizer of a certain convex optimization problem with a linear functional. We demonstrate that this framework can unify parts of four largely independent streams in the literature: tolls in transportation systems, Walrasian equilibria, trading networks, and congestion control. Besides reproving existing results we establish new enforceability results for these domains as well.

Zitieren

APA

Harks, T., & Schwarz, J. (2023). A Unified Framework for Pricing in Nonconvex Resource Allocation Games. SIAM Journal on Optimization, 33(2), 1223-1249. https://doi.org/10.1137/21m1400924

Vancouver

Harks T, Schwarz J. A Unified Framework for Pricing in Nonconvex Resource Allocation Games. SIAM Journal on Optimization. 2023;33(2):1223-1249. doi:10.1137/21m1400924

BibTeX
@article{Harks2023,
  author = {Harks, Tobias and Schwarz, Julian},
  title = {A Unified Framework for Pricing in Nonconvex Resource Allocation Games},
  journal = {SIAM Journal on Optimization},
  year = {2023},
  volume = {33},
  number = {2},
  pages = {1223--1249},
  doi = {10.1137/21m1400924}
}
Kostenlos starten →