Necessary and Sufficient Conditions Are Converse Relations
Theoria · 11.11.2026
DOI: 10.1111/theo.70135 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Theoria, online erschienen am 11.11.2026. Verfasst von Matheus Martins Silva. Die Arbeit nennt 19 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
According to the so‐called ‘standard theory of conditions’, ‘being a sufficient condition of’ and ‘being a necessary condition of’ are converse relations, that is, if A is a sufficient condition for B , B is a necessary condition for A . This theory faces well‐known counterexamples that appeal to causal and other asymmetric considerations. I show that these counterexamples lose their plausibility once we clarify two key assumptions of the standard theory: that to satisfy a condition is to instantiate a property, and that what is usually called the ‘conditionship relation’ is an inferential relation. Throughout the paper, I favour this way of interpreting the standard theory over an alternative interpretation outlined in causal terms, since it can be applied to all the counterexamples without losing its intuitive appeal.
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APA
Silva, M. M. (2026). Necessary and Sufficient Conditions Are Converse Relations. Theoria. https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.70135
Vancouver
Silva MM. Necessary and Sufficient Conditions Are Converse Relations. Theoria. 2026. doi:10.1111/theo.70135
BibTeX
@article{Silva2026,
author = {Silva, Matheus Martins},
title = {Necessary and Sufficient Conditions Are Converse Relations},
journal = {Theoria},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1111/theo.70135}
}
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