Arbitrary Reference and Weak Discernibility
Theoria · 2026-04 · 92 (2)
DOI: 10.1111/theo.70077 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Theoria, online erschienen am 08.03.2026. Verfasst von Sofía Meléndez Gutiérrez. Die Arbeit nennt 29 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Two entities are weakly discernible when they share every single one of their intrinsic and relational properties, but a symmetric and irreflexive relation holds between them. The theory of arbitrary reference, first proposed by Breckenridge and Magidor in 2012, states that some semantic facts are brute. And, in this paper, I argue that this theory is inconsistent with the thesis that weakly discernible entities are metaphysically possible. For the advocates of arbitrary reference, this result is problematic for two independent reasons. First: the thesis that weakly discernible entities are metaphysically possible is strikingly plausible and supported by a variety of compelling arguments. If it is true, though, then the theory of arbitrary reference is false. And second: some of the applications that the theory of arbitrary reference has been claimed to have depend on the assumption that weakly discernible entities are metaphysically possible. Those who have tried to take advantage of said applications (e.g., ante rem structuralists) will find, consequently, that their projects are doomed to fail.
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APA
Gutiérrez, S. M. (2026). Arbitrary Reference and Weak Discernibility. Theoria, 92(2). https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.70077
Vancouver
Gutiérrez SM. Arbitrary Reference and Weak Discernibility. Theoria. 2026;92(2). doi:10.1111/theo.70077
BibTeX
@article{Gutirrez2026,
author = {Gutiérrez, Sofía Meléndez},
title = {Arbitrary Reference and Weak Discernibility},
journal = {Theoria},
year = {2026},
volume = {92},
number = {2},
doi = {10.1111/theo.70077}
}
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