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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Theoria, online erschienen am 23.10.2017. Verfasst von Brian Besong. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 4-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 14 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Does having an initially high level of justified confidence in a belief vindicate remaining steadfast in the face of disagreement? According to one prominent view in the literature, namely Jennifer Lackey's justificationist position, the answer is yes so long as one also has personal information that provides a symmetry‐breaker. In this article, I raise a problem for the justificationist view. On the most straightforward reading of the justificationist position, personal information always provides a symmetry‐breaker in a peer dispute over a belief in which one has high justified confidence. However, this position is implausibly strong because it renders epistemically permissible a dogmatic attitude in a relevant set of peer disagreements. Alternatively, weaker readings of the view fail to provide a perspicuous account of when high justified confidence matters in a disagreement.
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APA
Besong, B. (2017). Disagreeing with Confidence. Theoria, 83(4), 419-439. https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12134
Vancouver
Besong B. Disagreeing with Confidence. Theoria. 2017;83(4):419-439. doi:10.1111/theo.12134
BibTeX
@article{Besong2017,
author = {Besong, Brian},
title = {Disagreeing with Confidence},
journal = {Theoria},
year = {2017},
volume = {83},
number = {4},
pages = {419--439},
doi = {10.1111/theo.12134}
}
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