Parity, Preference and Puzzlement
Theoria · 2015-09 · 81 (3) · 249-271
DOI: 10.1111/theo.12069 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Theoria, online erschienen am 05.03.2015. Verfasst von Joshua Gert. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 8-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 20 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: National Endowment for the Humanities.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
R uth C hang has argued for the existence of a fourth positive value relation, distinct from betterness, worseness and equality, which she calls “parity.” In an earlier article I seemed to criticize C hang's suggestion by offering an interval model for the values of items that I claimed could accommodate all the phenomena characteristic of parity. W lodek R abinowicz, offering his own model of value relations, endorsed one central feature of my proposal: the need to distinguish permissible preferences from required ones. But he, along with C hang, correctly pointed out that my own model suffered from serious formal problems. The present article offers an improved interval model, but the main point is not the model itself. Rather, it is the derivation of the model from a response‐dependent account of practical rationality. This derivation helps explain why we have a concept for which R abinowicz's model is appropriate, and therefore supplements C hang's existence arguments. My conclusion is that we can take C hang's view, R abinowicz's and mine as providing a reinforcing set of views.
Förderung
- National Endowment for the Humanities
Zitieren
APA
Gert, J. (2015). Parity, Preference and Puzzlement. Theoria, 81(3), 249-271. https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12069
Vancouver
Gert J. Parity, Preference and Puzzlement. Theoria. 2015;81(3):249-271. doi:10.1111/theo.12069
BibTeX
@article{Gert2015,
author = {Gert, Joshua},
title = {Parity, Preference and Puzzlement},
journal = {Theoria},
year = {2015},
volume = {81},
number = {3},
pages = {249--271},
doi = {10.1111/theo.12069}
}
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