Competing for a Profit‐Shifting Firm
Scottish Journal of Political Economy · 10.07.2026
DOI: 10.1111/sjpe.70077 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Scottish Journal of Political Economy, online erschienen am 10.07.2026. Verfasst von Jie Ma und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 16 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We investigate tax competition between two asymmetric countries bidding for an MNE subsidiary. Departing from standard zero‐sum models of profit reallocation between hosts, we introduce an “inward shifting” mechanism where profits flow from a high‐tax headquarters country to the host. This expands the host's tax base, strategically incentivizing the small country to adopt lax transfer pricing regulations. In equilibrium, the small country leverages this regulatory leniency to overcome its market‐size disadvantage, attracting the MNE and raising tax revenue. Furthermore, this outcome is reinforced as trade costs decline and economic integration advances.
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APA
Ma, J., Raimondos, P., & Yuan, C. (2026). Competing for a Profit‐Shifting Firm. Scottish Journal of Political Economy. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjpe.70077
Vancouver
Ma J, Raimondos P, Yuan C. Competing for a Profit‐Shifting Firm. Scottish Journal of Political Economy. 2026. doi:10.1111/sjpe.70077
BibTeX
@article{Ma2026,
author = {Ma, Jie and Raimondos, Pascalis and Yuan, Cheng},
title = {Competing for a Profit‐Shifting Firm},
journal = {Scottish Journal of Political Economy},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1111/sjpe.70077}
}
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