Fake Tax Residency and Tax Competition
Scottish Journal of Political Economy · 06.07.2026
DOI: 10.1111/sjpe.70076 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Scottish Journal of Political Economy, online erschienen am 06.07.2026. Verfasst von Alejandro Esteller‐Moré und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 33 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0). Gefördert von: Instituto de Estudios Fiscales.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Wealthy individuals exploit jurisdictional tax differences through mobility, challenging residence‐based tax systems—particularly via fictitious residency changes. We examine theoretically two countries competing to maximize tax revenues from wealthy individuals while auditing fraudulent residency claims. Taxpayers are shown to sort into non‐movers, illegal movers, and legal movers. We characterize equilibrium tax policies across varying conditions of mobility, country size, information exchange, and evasion sanctions. Our main finding is that stronger sanctions and information exchange both increase the optimal level of enforcement, reducing fraudulent tax relocations and increasing legal relocations, with an overall decline in total relocations.
Förderung
- Instituto de Estudios Fiscales
Zitieren
APA
Esteller‐Moré, A., & Galmarini, U. (2026). Fake Tax Residency and Tax Competition. Scottish Journal of Political Economy. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjpe.70076
Vancouver
Esteller‐Moré A, Galmarini U. Fake Tax Residency and Tax Competition. Scottish Journal of Political Economy. 2026. doi:10.1111/sjpe.70076
BibTeX
@article{EstellerMor2026,
author = {Esteller‐Moré, Alejandro and Galmarini, Umberto},
title = {Fake Tax Residency and Tax Competition},
journal = {Scottish Journal of Political Economy},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1111/sjpe.70076}
}
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