Bonus incentives and team effort levels: Evidence from the “Field” *
Scottish Journal of Political Economy · 2020-11 · 67 (5) · 539-550
DOI: 10.1111/sjpe.12249 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Scottish Journal of Political Economy, online erschienen am 25.06.2020. Verfasst von Robert Butler und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 8-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 23 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This study explores the effect of bonus incentive mechanisms with a focus on how such a scheme influences aggregate production levels of teams of workers, specifically. We identify this using data from a highly competitive setting in professional sport, which involves a unique tournament design rule in an elite European rugby competition. The modelling results demonstrate qualified evidence that introducing bonuses to encourage teams to score via the most‐difficult, highest‐reward mode, incentivizes teams to increase effort to earn the bonus, and without reducing production after the bonus is achieved.
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APA
Butler, R., Lenten, L. J. A., & Massey, P. (2020). Bonus incentives and team effort levels: Evidence from the “Field” *. Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 67(5), 539-550. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjpe.12249
Vancouver
Butler R, Lenten LJA, Massey P. Bonus incentives and team effort levels: Evidence from the “Field” *. Scottish Journal of Political Economy. 2020;67(5):539-550. doi:10.1111/sjpe.12249
BibTeX
@article{Butler2020,
author = {Butler, Robert and Lenten, Liam J. A. and Massey, Patrick},
title = {Bonus incentives and team effort levels: Evidence from the “Field” *},
journal = {Scottish Journal of Political Economy},
year = {2020},
volume = {67},
number = {5},
pages = {539--550},
doi = {10.1111/sjpe.12249}
}
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