A Theoretical Analysis of the Influence of Money Injections on Risk Taking in Football Clubs
Scottish Journal of Political Economy · 2014-09 · 61 (4) · 430-454
DOI: 10.1111/sjpe.12052 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Scottish Journal of Political Economy, online erschienen am 23.07.2014. Verfasst von Egon Franck und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 52-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 40 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper analyzes the adverse incentive effects produced by money injections of benefactors [sugar daddies (SD)]. We show that the existence of a SD induces the club to choose a riskier investment strategy and the more the SD commits to bailout the club, the more the clubs’ optimal level of riskiness increases. Moreover, a private SD bails out the club less often than a public SD. Our model further shows that a ‘too‐big‐to‐fail’ phenomenon exists because it is optimal to always bailout a club if its market size is sufficiently large.
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APA
Franck, E., & Lang, M. (2014). A Theoretical Analysis of the Influence of Money Injections on Risk Taking in Football Clubs. Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 61(4), 430-454. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjpe.12052
Vancouver
Franck E, Lang M. A Theoretical Analysis of the Influence of Money Injections on Risk Taking in Football Clubs. Scottish Journal of Political Economy. 2014;61(4):430-454. doi:10.1111/sjpe.12052
BibTeX
@article{Franck2014,
author = {Franck, Egon and Lang, Markus},
title = {A Theoretical Analysis of the Influence of Money Injections on Risk Taking in Football Clubs},
journal = {Scottish Journal of Political Economy},
year = {2014},
volume = {61},
number = {4},
pages = {430--454},
doi = {10.1111/sjpe.12052}
}
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