Personal and irreplaceable value: A phenomenological approach
The Southern Journal of Philosophy · 22.07.2026
DOI: 10.1111/sjp.70057 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Southern Journal of Philosophy, online erschienen am 22.07.2026. Verfasst von Eric J. Mohr. Die Arbeit nennt 42 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
If irreplaceable value exists, then what is it and what is its source? I argue that we talk about irreplaceable value conditionally, as a historical value, and unconditionally, as a personal value. The latter is the condition for the former. If so, it is not the case that a kind of circumstantial uniqueness (unreinstantiable uniqueness) confers irreplaceable value, but that persons do, provided that irreplaceable value is a value persons possess. I defend this by offering a Schelerian argument for personal value over a Kantian one, namely, the value of personal individuality. I identify the seat and center of personal irreplaceability to be a nonrepresentational, individual value orientation, evidence for which is presented within a first‐personal context of loving intimacy. Personal irreplaceability is the condition for the significance of individual characteristics and for the irreplaceable value of relevant unreinstantiable objects.
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APA
Mohr, E. J. (2026). Personal and irreplaceable value: A phenomenological approach. The Southern Journal of Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.70057
Vancouver
Mohr EJ. Personal and irreplaceable value: A phenomenological approach. The Southern Journal of Philosophy. 2026. doi:10.1111/sjp.70057
BibTeX
@article{Mohr2026,
author = {Mohr, Eric J.},
title = {Personal and irreplaceable value: A phenomenological approach},
journal = {The Southern Journal of Philosophy},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1111/sjp.70057}
}
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