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Affective Intentionality and Affective Injustice: Merleau‐Ponty and Fanon on the Body Schema as a Theory of Affect

Shiloh Whitney

The Southern Journal of Philosophy · 2018-12 · 56 (4) · 488-515

DOI: 10.1111/sjp.12307 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Southern Journal of Philosophy, online erschienen am 10.12.2018. Verfasst von Shiloh Whitney. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 109-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 54 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

I argue that there is an affective injustice in gendered and racialized oppression. To account for this, we must deny the opposition of affect and intentionality often assumed in the philosophy of emotion and the affective turn: while affect and intentionality are not opposed in principle, affective intentionality may be refused uptake in oppressive practices. In section 1, I read Merleau‐Ponty’s theory of the body schema as a theory of affect that accommodates my account of affective injustice and aligns with accounts of affect transmission and circulation in feminist philosophies of the affective turn. This is crucial for understanding Fanon’s contribution to the theory of the body schema, in which it is susceptible to historical‐racial “affective disorders.” In sections 2–4, I distinguish three types of affective injustice: affective marginalization, exploitation, and violence. In section 2 I develop an intersectional feminist account of this distinction drawing on Lorde and Lugones and raise questions about the limits of framing the issue of affective injustice in terms of intentionality as opposed to a more psychoanalytic conceptual vocabulary that accommodates the displacement of affective force. In sections 3 and 4, I explore these affective injustices through an analysis of Fanonian concepts, showing how the theory of the body schema can accommodate not only affective intentionality but also the oppressive disjunction of affect and intentionality, as well as forms of affective injustice that exceed the oppressive disabling of sense‐making and involve the exploitative and violent displacement of affective force.

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APA

Whitney, S. (2018). Affective Intentionality and Affective Injustice: Merleau‐Ponty and Fanon on the Body Schema as a Theory of Affect. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 56(4), 488-515. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12307

Vancouver

Whitney S. Affective Intentionality and Affective Injustice: Merleau‐Ponty and Fanon on the Body Schema as a Theory of Affect. The Southern Journal of Philosophy. 2018;56(4):488-515. doi:10.1111/sjp.12307

BibTeX
@article{Whitney2018,
  author = {Whitney, Shiloh},
  title = {Affective Intentionality and Affective Injustice: Merleau‐Ponty and Fanon on the Body Schema as a Theory of Affect},
  journal = {The Southern Journal of Philosophy},
  year = {2018},
  volume = {56},
  number = {4},
  pages = {488--515},
  doi = {10.1111/sjp.12307}
}
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