Meaning in Life: In Defense of the Hybrid View
The Southern Journal of Philosophy · 2016-09 · 54 (3) · 355-371
DOI: 10.1111/sjp.12179 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Southern Journal of Philosophy, online erschienen am 07.09.2016. Verfasst von Daan Evers und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 20-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 11 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
According to Susan Wolf's hybrid view about meaning in life, a life is meaningful in virtue of subjective attraction to objectively valuable pursuits. Recently, several philosophers have presented counterexamples to the subjective element in Wolf's view. We argue that these examples are not clearly successful and present a modified version which is even stronger in the face of them. Finally, we offer some positive reasons for accepting a subjective condition on a meaningful life.
Zitieren
APA
Evers, D., & Smeden, G. E. V. (2016). Meaning in Life: In Defense of the Hybrid View. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 54(3), 355-371. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12179
Vancouver
Evers D, Smeden GEV. Meaning in Life: In Defense of the Hybrid View. The Southern Journal of Philosophy. 2016;54(3):355-371. doi:10.1111/sjp.12179
BibTeX
@article{Evers2016,
author = {Evers, Daan and Smeden, Gerlinde Emma van},
title = {Meaning in Life: In Defense of the Hybrid View},
journal = {The Southern Journal of Philosophy},
year = {2016},
volume = {54},
number = {3},
pages = {355--371},
doi = {10.1111/sjp.12179}
}
EUVIMED