On Explaining Why Time Seems to Pass
The Southern Journal of Philosophy · 2013-09 · 51 (3) · 367-382
DOI: 10.1111/sjp.12033 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 2013-09. Verfasst von Natalja Deng. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 33-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 12 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Usually, the B ‐theory of time is taken to involve the claim that time does not, in reality, pass; after all, on the B ‐theory, nothing really becomes present and then more and more past, times do not come into existence successively, and which facts obtain does not change. For this reason, many B ‐theorists have recently tried to explain away one or more aspect(s) of experience that they and their opponents take to constitute an experience of time as passing. In this paper, I examine three prominent proposals of this kind and argue that, though intriguing, the proposals undermine, to some extent, the assumption that there is an element of experience that B ‐theorists need to take to be illusory.
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APA
Deng, N. (2013). On Explaining Why Time Seems to Pass. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 51(3), 367-382. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12033
Vancouver
Deng N. On Explaining Why Time Seems to Pass. The Southern Journal of Philosophy. 2013;51(3):367-382. doi:10.1111/sjp.12033
BibTeX
@article{Deng2013,
author = {Deng, Natalja},
title = {On Explaining Why Time Seems to Pass},
journal = {The Southern Journal of Philosophy},
year = {2013},
volume = {51},
number = {3},
pages = {367--382},
doi = {10.1111/sjp.12033}
}
EUVIMED