Biased forecasts and voting
The Scandinavian Journal of Economics · 10.11.2026
DOI: 10.1111/sjoe.70052 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, online erschienen am 10.11.2026. Verfasst von Jacopo Bizzotto und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 42 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We introduce macroeconomic forecasters as strategic agents who may bias their reports to influence their audience. We test the motives of forecasters using monthly forecaster‐level data around the Brexit referendum. To guide our analysis, we model the way in which a referendum voter forms expectations based on the reports of a politically motivated forecaster. The forecaster trades off its reputation for honesty against the opportunity to influence the vote. The model predicts that the forecaster lies selectively and continues to do so even after the referendum. Our analysis finds that forecasters exposed to financial losses from Brexit issued significantly less accurate GDP growth forecasts than others. The findings suggest that influential forecasters may strategically manipulate information when the stakes are high.
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APA
Bizzotto, J., Cipullo, D., & Reslow, A. (2026). Biased forecasts and voting. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.70052
Vancouver
Bizzotto J, Cipullo D, Reslow A. Biased forecasts and voting. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics. 2026. doi:10.1111/sjoe.70052
BibTeX
@article{Bizzotto2026,
author = {Bizzotto, Jacopo and Cipullo, Davide and Reslow, André},
title = {Biased forecasts and voting},
journal = {The Scandinavian Journal of Economics},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1111/sjoe.70052}
}
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