Winning the prescription: competitive tenders versus decentralized competition
The Scandinavian Journal of Economics · 17.11.2026
DOI: 10.1111/sjoe.70051 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, online erschienen am 17.11.2026. Verfasst von Kurt R. Brekke und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 29 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Payers increasingly use competitive tendering to reduce expenditures on patent‐protected pharmaceuticals. Using a duopoly model with horizontally differentiated drugs, we show that tendering can harm patients and fail to reduce costs. When demand depends on physicians' tolerance for treatment loss, tendering yields a mixed‐strategy equilibrium: firms balance bidding low to win the contract against bidding high to exploit residual demand. Compared with decentralized competition, tendering worsens patient outcomes and increases expected prices unless the treatment‐loss tolerance is sufficiently high. Quality asymmetries and captive segments further amplify these distortions, highlighting critical trade‐offs in procurement design.
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APA
Brekke, K. R., Dalen, D. M., & Straume, O. R. (2026). Winning the prescription: competitive tenders versus decentralized competition. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.70051
Vancouver
Brekke KR, Dalen DM, Straume OR. Winning the prescription: competitive tenders versus decentralized competition. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics. 2026. doi:10.1111/sjoe.70051
BibTeX
@article{Brekke2026,
author = {Brekke, Kurt R. and Dalen, Dag Morten and Straume, Odd Rune},
title = {Winning the prescription: competitive tenders versus decentralized competition},
journal = {The Scandinavian Journal of Economics},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1111/sjoe.70051}
}
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