Information disclosure and questionnaires in public tenders
The Scandinavian Journal of Economics · 19.05.2026
DOI: 10.1111/sjoe.70027 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, online erschienen am 19.05.2026. Verfasst von Thomas Greve und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 49 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Public tenders typically involve uncertainty and unforeseen costs, which might not be fully known to the bidders themselves. This uncertainty may also concern adaptation costs to the procurer after the delivery, and information about such adaptation costs may influence the bidding strategies, even though the cost is paid by the procurer. Consequently, the availability of information matters, and if it is obtained by the procurer, withholding information from bidders may be better than sharing all of it. To investigate the methods of gathering information, we consider pre‐qualification stage questionnaires designed to obtain information from the bidders. If suitably designed, they can be used to disclose information of which the bidders are themselves unaware and can thereby serve as a tool for revealing the inherent tendency of the cost for the bidders, so that the unforeseen future cost can be estimated.
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APA
Greve, T., & Keiding, H. (2026). Information disclosure and questionnaires in public tenders. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.70027
Vancouver
Greve T, Keiding H. Information disclosure and questionnaires in public tenders. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics. 2026. doi:10.1111/sjoe.70027
BibTeX
@article{Greve2026,
author = {Greve, Thomas and Keiding, Hans},
title = {Information disclosure and questionnaires in public tenders},
journal = {The Scandinavian Journal of Economics},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1111/sjoe.70027}
}
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